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THE SPECIFIC WAY OF INDIVIDUALIZATION IN GERMANY: A 
CULTURE-THEORETICAL COMPARISON TO THE USA1 
 
Thomas Kron 





The paper examines the sociological reflections of individualization processes in 
Germany and the USA. In this comparison it appears that German sociology 
identifies a “dialectical individualization” whereas sociology in the US ascertains 
a “social individualization”. It is elaborated that the actual cause for this 
difference (which is important for, but mostly ignored in the public-political 
discourse) is on the one hand the relative cultural inheritance, and on the other 
hand the developments of post World-War II. Thus, the example of 
individualization shows that sociological theory has to be more sensitive towards 
cultural idiosyncrasies and towards specific historical steps in development. 
 
 
In sociological investigations country-specific peculiarities are generalized far too often. 
In this case, for instance, we speak of the western culture or of the modern trend, although the 
countries referred to have obviously developed cultural identities, political and legal systems, 
economic systems or joint connections of their own. For the still too little developed 
international sociology the danger arises to generalize local observations too much and often 
falsely. With this contribution, I would like to show that the consideration of country-specific 
cultural developments on the one hand leads to a better understanding of certain developments 
and on the other hand provides protection against exaggerated generalizations of local 
sociological insights (same direction as Fukuyma [1999]).  
 I would like to prove this according to the example of the so-called “individualization 
thesis” (Beck 1992; Beck/Beck Gernsheim 2002; Beck/Sopp 1997; Kron 2000; 2001; Schroer 
2000a; 2000b), which apparently is a special term used in the German sociological discourse, 
although sociology in other countries also mostly seems interested to a great extent in the 
relationship of the individual and society. We can almost say, sociology as a science owes its 
birth to the spirit of the individuality of social actors (Nassehi 2000).  
On the basis of a comparison of social-historical developments of the cultural identities 
of Germany to the US, I would like to explain why, particularly in Germany the individualization 
thesis found such a promulgation and, as a contrast, not in the US. Firstly, the central arguments 
of the individualization thesis of the German sociological discourse are described (1). I will 
explain on which cultural basis such discourse could be established. Subsequently, I will show 
why the US have always paid special attention to the relationship of the individual and society, 
but why due to their special cultural foundation this relationship has been reflected sociologically 
differently than in Germany (2). The proceeding is thereby evolutionary, i.e. I will look at those 
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developing steps in examples, from which I assume that they had a crucial influence on the 
attitudes towards the relationship of the individual and society.  
 
WHAT DOES INDIVIDUALIZATION MEAN?  
 
Individualization is in general the sociological description of changes in relation of the 
individual and society and at the same time the attempt to explain these changes. Unfortunately 
though, it has not been clearly clarified from the sociological beginnings until today which 
dimensions of modern individualization processes are important (Kippele 1998). I therefore 
suggest, for heuristic purposes to describe the term of individualization on the basis of three 
dimensions in which, according to my opinion, the largest sociological common sense 
concerning modern individualization is to be found:  
 
(1) Culture: Individualization in the cultural dimension is usually associated with a 
“pluralization” of values and/or an increasing non-commitment of moral 
conceptions. Values and moral opinions are incumbent on individual inter-
pretation. In individualization, a complementary interpretation sees an increasing 
alignment to the value of individualism. Each individual becomes a point of 
reference of the appreciation of the good life (Hasteadt 1998).  
(2) Structure: Individualization in the structural dimension is always a main topic of 
sociology, which is addressed particularly in the context of explanations to the 
social differentiation (Schimank 1996). On the one hand, under the dictum of 
liberty, the qualitative “disembedding” of the individual from familiar, economic, 
political, or other institutional obligations is mentioned here. On the other hand, 
rather quantitative characteristics as multiplied, extended, interlaced, and/or 
spatio-temporally flexible interaction relations are pointed out.  
(3) Individual Autonomy: Individualization means the extension of the individual 
action area, in this dimension particularly both, according to the increase of 
courses of action and by the increase of chances to notice these possibilities 
individually and to decide over the action choice yourself. According to this, there 
often is an acceptance of an internal-psychological differentiation, which is 
predominantly understood as a consciousness of the own ego. This rather 
psychological perspective also entails the association of intensified self-control 





In a first step, I would now like to discuss the German individualization discourse along 
these three dimensions. It concerns thereby of a recapturing representation of central arguments, 
i.e. the authors mentioned here exemplary stand with their theses for figures, which are single 
aspects of — in some cases completely different and contradicting — theories. Hereby, the 
knowledge-sociological question why the individualization theorem is (nearly) an exclusive 
affair of the German sociological discourse is important. 
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The German Individualization Discourse  
 
Nowhere else was the individualization phenomenon discussed so intensively as in 
Germany, particularly since Ulrich Beck’s diagnosis of the risk-society, first published in 1986. 
Ever since the individualization term may not be missed in any reflection of the contemporary 
society, which raises the claim to be complete.  
One figure referring to the cultural dimension above all points out the change and the 
continuity of values. So the talk of “change of values” is not only popular in the public in 
Germany, but also widespread in the entire scientific community. As a pioneer, Niklas Luhmann 
(1978; 1990; 1997a) has to be mentioned here, who does not doubt the fact that many moral 
communications circulate in present society, and/or that values in the name of most different 
demands are to serve as a legitimate basis. But Luhmann, however, refers to the fact that the 
dynamics of the evolution of social systems in modern society do not depend on values. Social 
order in the context of functional differentiation is — in differentiation to Talcott Parsons — also 
possible without a basis of common values, for surviving simply evolution is enough (Luhmann 
1995).  
Other authors are less radical, if they state the fact that there are still values, which must 
be interpreted and implemented more individually now. So the project of modernity carried by 
values is still unfinished, but one can nevertheless state a secularization of their legitimacy bases 
(Habermas 1985). Society is aligned to a certain opinion of the good life (as a value), that has 
discharged a most individualistic adventure-rationality in its practical conversion, which sets free 
the total-collective value alignment (Schulze 1992). This does not exclude a collective 
orientation completely, but makes it necessary at the point when the individual does not come to 
terms with itself any longer, and therefore wants to use socially practiced forms of ego-identity. 
In this way, there is still a fundamental cultural orientation of present society at the ideals of the 
enlightenment (Beck 1992; Gross 1994; Münch 1995), whereby the basic dynamics are 
particularly pointed out by the tension between ideal and reality, which involves a dialectic of 
self-disproving pretensions: “Modernity, such firework of demands of generalization and 
universalism, has always been limited and practiced by its opposite. In other words: 
Modernization [...] and counter-modernization – exclusion and absorption of the principles of the 
modern – are firstly of the same origin [...]. Here modernization is not only seen as a multi-
layered process with tendencies and structures moving in opposite directions, but sharper: as an 
unclosed, not-closeable dialectic of modernization and counter-modernization.” (Beck 1996, pp. 
60/61, translated by TK) The increase of action options (liberty), the increase of the participation 
in action options (equality) and the minimum participation in existing action options (fraternity) 
are built-in into this dialectic. The consequence is an increasing imperative, which could be 
restrained only if it could be regarded as an option and thus as an alternative apart from other 
alternatives. Then modernity could cut off the program of difference reduction between reality 
and possibility (Gross 1994).  
Despite a continuity of values, contemporary transformations of these value bases are 
thus also seen in the sense of an individualization in the cultural dimension: While values 
maintain their general validity, the factual specification is left increasingly to the individuals. 
Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim in this way describe e.g. the changes in intimate 
systems, that transform the historical exceptional case of the appreciation of the institution 
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“marriage” in the 1950s and 1960s into a “normal chaos of love” (Beck/Beck-Gernsheim 1995), 
but that still follows the “form-instruction” of love (Fuchs 1999).  
Here, one can see how the increasing imperative “disobliges” all certainties, collateral 
and traditions and also all values embodied in the principles of modernity. Everything becomes 
contingent in the light of the possible, whose borders (e.g. technical) are hardly visible. In the 
long run only the “God of More” will be rendered homage and all other values will be set aside. 
Here, dialectic dynamics are much recognized as the fundamental modern ideas also always 
producing unintended side effects and which contradict the actual goals (Münch 1991, 1995). 
Thus, modernity is already a society at risk in its fundamentals. 
With most German authors, you can say that this dialectic perspective continues also in 
the structural dimension, in which the figure of disembedding and integration is particularly 
pointed out. System-theoretically you could interpret individualization in such a way here that 
individuality is won not in social systems, but outside of these. Not the affiliation to subsystems 
marks the indivisibility of the actors, but the non-affiliation: State, law, economics, science, 
medicine, even art, religion and education only in each case partially access aspects of the 
individuality; the area of inclusion is in the long run only interested in a part (divisible) of the 
individual. Whereas in the area of exclusion, only the individual in each case, i.e. the indivisible 
field of the personal self description emerges increasingly (Nassehi 1997). On the other hand, 
this “exclusion-individuality” however affiliates to society at least in two different respects: First 
of all, the individuals in principle are included as persons in modern society into all social 
systems, i.e. one assumes a universe “all-inclusion”: Everyone can and should participate in all 
communication systems – education, economy, law, politics, media system, and so forth. As a 
consequence of the functional differentiation of society, individuals are no more definable by 
social positions, but they should gain access to all subsystems, i.e. , modern society requires a 
simultaneous affiliation to different subsystems. Secondly, individuality is often generated over 
demands and careers and thus over the linkage to part-systemic organizational structures, 
according to the form of modern society (Luhmann 1994). 
Accordingly, one speaks of the dissolution of traditional structures and the integration 
into new structures. These new structures are certain milieus, which are formed among other 
things over the dynamics of the adventure market: milieus provide individuals with their 
experience of dissolving traditional structures, orientation and certainty that adventures are at 
hand. This structural formation is also called “disobligation” of existing structures when at the 
same time enabling-structures emerge; or “erosion of common structures” due to the penetration 
of solidarity-strange resources. On the one hand, this “colonialization of the environment” 
(Habermas) is understood exclusively as infiltrating the community by the system-logic of the 
market; on the other hand one sees this development again rather dialectic as mutual penetration: 
traditional community structures are beginning to move, but at the same time institutional 
complexes assigned to other system logics are penetrated by the solidly mobilization. Altogether, 
we can speak of the “paradox of the individualism” (Münch 1991): The individual becomes more 
freely and dependent at the same time. 
In a way, this trend of dialectic points of view with the accentuation of the figure of 
“risky chances” finds a continuation also in the dimension of individual autonomy. Luhmann 
sees the action area of the individuals substantially extended by disembarrassment from the close 
borders of pre-modern conditions; the use of symbolically generalized communication media e.g. 
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takes place without consideration of specific person characteristics. But on the other side the 
action area is limited by the possibility of “exclusion-catenation” (Schimank 2000): Those who 
cannot assert on inclusion into a social subsystem any longer, suddenly also experience problems 
to adopt to and fit in other systems. With the increase of action options and decision, autonomy 
always bears the risks of taking the wrong decision and therefore come along with self-inflicted 
restrictions. The uncertainties in taking decisions which come along with the increasing freedom 
of choice are compensated in the long run by routines, what can indeed lead to a subjectively 
sinking intensity of the feeling of an “own life.” 
Thus, the most important arguments of the German individualization discourse are 
described. Hereby, the almost constant dialectic viewpoint is remarkable. Therefore, we could 
also speak of a dialectic individualization process.2  
Looking at the evaluation of this individualization process described by the German 
authors, we can see that first of all the integration of society is a measure. This is particularly 
evident if we look at the solutions or/and advices presented by the German authors, how to deal 
with diagnosed individualization. If the solution aims at a change of given conditions, we can 
assume that the author altogether makes a negative evaluation of present individualization 
processes. On the other hand: Why should one want to change something if the general 
impression is a positive one? Regarding this background to this categorization of the evaluations 
in relation to the descriptions, it is noticeable, particularly for the German authors that the 
dialectic description tends to result in a coupling with positive evaluations. According to 
Luhmann’s view, it is better to leave the necessary problem solution competences to the social 
evolution and not to try to intervene in social processes by steering (Luhmann 1997b). In short, 
everything can stay as it is; one enjoys the advantages of the functional differentiation of society, 
which at the same time works as self-corrective of the difficulties produced by itself. The authors 
advise a kind of cultivation, the “Laissez-faire”: We can get the appropriate attitude and “learn to 
play with the nothing” (Schulze), learn to accept differences (Gross) and deal with contradictions 
(Münch). Somewhat more active, Beck, above all others, encourages the use of changed 
conditions, e.g. in the form of “sub-politics” or life politics. 
In the center of the following considerations, the question is: How could it come to such 
an individualization discourse, which is shaped by a dialectic description and a positive 
evaluation, particularly and exclusively in Germany? I assume here two different causes: The 
cultural inheritance of the meaning of individualism in Germany and the historical development 
post World War II. 
 
The Cultural Inheritance of Individualism in Germany 
 
Modern culture has generated a certain understanding in Germany, what is to be 
understood by individualism (Münch 1986; 2001). In general, liberty in Germany always means 
an inner liberty of the individual, whose concretion results in the social (e.g. the concretion of 
political liberty by constitutional legality). The origins of this conception are ascribed to Martin 
Luther and Immanuel Kant. With Luther, the liberty of the Christian is a liberty of the soul 
independent of all things outside. The transformation of this internal into outer liberty means in 
exact words: obedience to the word of God. This terminology of liberty is taken up and 
secularized by Kant. Kant views liberty as liberty of the “sensuousness” (Sinnlichkeit) of 
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humans, humans are free as sanity beings. So Kant connects moral acting to the idea of the 
subject, by presupposing liberty, understood as absence of the regulation by outside causes, for 
moral acting. All actions deriving from respect for the moral law of the categorical imperative 
are thus expressions of the autonomy of the acting subject, which gives itself the law of acting 
independently of any experience. Autonomy here means: The subject imposes on itself laws, 
which it obeys. The relevant condition for moral acting is thereby the free determination of the 
own will, free of outer influences and motivated only by subjective obligation. The description of 
the generalization of the subjective obligation is achieved through the categorical imperative. In 
this way Kant produces the connection of the free subjective will to an over-individual 
standardization. 
It is obvious that Kant opened a dualism with the moral determination of the will directly 
by its general validity. The individual is not regarded as valuable in itself, but derives its value 
from an instance extending over it in an idealistic manner. On the one hand, the determination of 
the moral law coincides with the directive of the liberty and the autonomy of the will, but on the 
other hand, at this point liberty at the same time experiences its supreme restriction. It is exactly 
in this conception in which Kant sees the peculiar of his theory: “one looked at humans being 
bound by their obligation to laws, however it did not occur that their were not only subject to 
their own and yet general legislation” (Kant 1956, p. 65, translated by TK). Actually, the most 
personal demand of moral legislation in Kant’s moral philosophy is weakened by regarding self 
legislation: Here the subject gains distance from itself by reason and regards its own maxims 
according to the point of view of a generalized other — the human generality — so that in the 
long run each individual drive to setting values is switched off. The bare moral law determines 
the will. The internal liberty and orientation towards the law are thus connected inseparably with 
one another. This conception is the cultural inheritance of the individualism in Germany. 
 
Test the West: The Americanization of the Federal Republic  
 
We have to look at the changes after World War II as a background to this view, which 
always looked for the liberty of the individual in an over-individual law. Firstly, Germany also 
experienced what it means to lose individual freedom in a universality — in this case the 
“German community” (“Volksgemeinschaft”) with the advent of “national socialism” (National-
sozialismus). It is nothing less than the collapse of the German view on individualism, which was 
suggested here, because after all, individual liberty was endangered simply by the integration 
into this community. With this experience, a change of opinion did not necessarily have to 
accompany this after World War II: the own suffering often blocked the readiness for 
refurbishment and moral renewal. There was simply no time to realize the pain over the loss of 
the close community. Too much one had to meet new living conditions pointing into alternative 
directions: There is e.g. the “Re-Education” of the German, now open culture by the Allies, 
which above all was to cause the detachment of the ethics of the “national socialism”, but which 
has also customized the German culture towards American individualism. Paradoxically, the 
“purification process” introduced by the Allies was also successful, because the “Nazis” were so 
successful with their educational program before: the opponent Germany, once socialized to 
compliance, diligence, obedience and opportunism was a grateful receiver for educational 
defaults, clear instructions and thus for cultural transfers. The US became — with the ulterior 
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motives of the containment of the Soviet Union by a strong Western European center (Hanrieder 
1986) and Germany as confederate (Schumacher 2001) — the “friendly enemy,” who behaved 
fair and constructive in the light of the humanitarian disaster caused by the Germans. This made 
it easy for the Germans to get into — primarily mass-cultural (Trommler 1986) — innovations 
transported by the Allies, e.g. on the experiences with a popular culture (e.g. Swing, Jazz) 
beyond authoritarian twisting. 
 The prevention of the over-individual authority of Hitler in sum was caught by the turn 
to the over-individual authority — America. New luck can be found — not only under the 
protection, but also through an occupation power: The inheritance of Kant continues. And the 
“Americanization” of the Germans begins.3 The contrast to the Soviet zone of occupation 
(Faulenbach 1998; Jarausch/Siegrist 1997) showed quite clearly what one has already won at 
individual liberties with the loss of the community during the “Nazis” despite the occupation by 
the Western powers, because the anticommunist prejudices learned under the “Nazi” regime 
were at first confirmed by the bad experiences of the post-war period with the Soviets 
(plunderings, rapes, reparations, disassemblies). This affective basic pattern — here the good 
ones, there the bad ones — won intensity (and thus west orientation altogether) with the massive 
blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union and the supply of citizens of Berlin’s population with the 
help of the Anglo-American air-bridge. However, this event is only one descriptive example of 
the connection of economical assistance and political-cultural symbolism, that can be considered 
as the basic tenor of the European Recovery Programs (“Marshall-Plan”) (Hardach 2001; Schildt 
2000). Of special importance for the cultural change in Germany were primarily — so my thesis 
— those changes, which could be seen in everyday life. There, first of all, the “economic 
miracle” (“Wirtschaftswunder”) is noticeable for each individual during the 1950s 
(Schildt/Sywottek 1989). Due to this, the crucial push was performed, which gave the American 
influence mass popularity. The economic progress was connected with a goods-aesthetical gloss, 
symbolized e.g. by covergirls, who produced individual needs, which could be satisfied again in 
the consumption. 
Altogether one can recognize a turn above all of the younger population towards 
American individualism. Also, in this case, the generation transition is one of those important 
mechanisms that carried the Americanization particularly in the dimension of “deep lying 
mentality patterns” (Schildt 2000, p. 7; see Maase 1996; 1997). As a seismograph for the 
beginning development one can take the example of e.g. the so called “yobs”, which were 
interested (in the mostly culture-critical observer perspective) collectively in US-American 
products from jeans to Hollywood films with James Dean up to the new musical style Rock ‘n’ 
Roll of Bill Haley or Elvis Presley (Poiger 1997). By this, they express their individualistic-
emancipated orientation as a contrast program to the ruled civil order, combined with civilian 
laxness and demonstrative vulgarity in clothes, handling style and sexuality. The adoption to the 
value conception of individualism takes place as a break with the normative idea of the 
community (Doering-Manteuffel 1995, p. 26). 
Here not least also the US-American soldiers stationed in Germany were standards, who 
symbolized with their easy going body attitude, sportsmanship, and lax gesturing the opposite to 
the German soldier. “Here the two fundamental culture patterns collided in banal everyday life 
and the penetration of the German side began: the change and mood of the civilian habit.” 
(Doering-Manteuffel 1995, p. 20. translated by TK) This indirect control was promoted by the 
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American side consciously in the sense of a “propaganda through Entertainment.” In this way the 
“Americanization from bottom up” (Maase 1996) could work. 
But all liberties are always risky, too. And so Germany did not only implement the main 
features of Western modernization by means of Americanization, but also the paradoxes as 
consequences thereof. To cope with ambivalences was for most Germans, who were socialized 
in the national socialism straight to ambivalence destruction (Bauman 1992), still an unusual 
thing. So it cannot be of any surprise that the new liberties are always also accompanied by 
anxiety about maintaining the same and therefore come with new uncertainties. One now roughly 
agrees with the new direction, because with regards to economic growth, also the view that class 
conflicts (and thus the Marxist core of socialist theory, the class warfare thought) is transported 
and can be brought up durably not by redistribution of the given, but by enlargement of what can 
be distributed. And this “enlargement of the cake” which can be distributed at first, seems 
ensured over western orientation. But beyond this abstract opinion, there are everyday fears 
applied to the recovered liberty. Thus, the state became again the address for the fears and the 
demand to save the conditions for the liberties. Internal liberty in the protection of the state — 
here again Kant’s inheritance gleams. 
This strange mixture from clinging onto and re-orienting can also be seen accordingly in 
everyday life behavior of the Germans, e.g. on the basis of popular music (Larkey 2001). The 
fact that one did not become completely detached from past times, even under the pressure of the 
alluring offers could be seen within the new mass-cultural forms by the combination of the new 
aesthetics imported by America with traditional ideals like cleanliness and perfection. This need 
e.g. was corresponded by actresses (such as Doris Day), who embodied the White American 
middle-class in an almost over-perfect way. Even the American cult figure — Elvis Presley — 
who garnished his music with “vulgar” stylistic idiom (Elvis’ pelvis-swinging as a sexual stage 
act), work (the sweating singer), entertainment and commercialization, thus everything that raged 
against established cultural forms, was subjected to a “cleaning” (also of “black” influences), 
what accommodated the conservative forces in Germany. One result was his enlistment into the 
army, knowingly on German ground: In November 1958, the German youth magazine “Bravo” 
stated in its headline: “Does Elvis become a German? The smart salute proves it: he already is 
one” (Maase 1997, p. 219, translated by TK). And if this was not enough for those still seeing 
too much Entartetes (degenerated) in the so called “negro music,” he or she turned towards (or at 
least accepted) the German substitutes like Conny Froebess or Peter Kraus. Doering-Manteuffel 
(1995, p. 18) here speaks of an “amalgamation of German tradition and American influence” 
with the consequence that the “Americanization from bottom up” could become the “entrance 
drug into the political and military west connection of the Federal Republic” (Maase 1996, p. 
312, translated by TK). 
Liberties are not only experienced, but are often also used e.g. to protest against the new 
social conditions, which from the perspective of some activists had not sufficiently abandoned 
the former authoritarian structures and had resulted in a new establishment. America also had a 
role-model function here e.g. regarding principles of the civilian disobedience as protest forms 
(Kraushaar 1999), which found use against America, when criticism at the imperialistic attitude 
of the US became loud in the context of the Vietnam War. The students riots of the 1960’s, fed 
mentally and supported by left wing intellectuals, are likewise expressions of this protest against 
each form of liberty restriction. The anti-Americanism was in such a way seen as an 
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individualistic justified defense attitude which did not always find a consequent transformation 
on the behavioral level: “on the side they were a component of a trans-national network of the 
young generation, they receive the American youth culture, were modeled on the western-
American forms of individualism, criticized their parents because of their smugness, copied the 
Free-Speech-Movement, the Go- and Sit-In and cultivated nevertheless at the same time those 
habits which were riddled with anti-American culture criticism which was not much different 
from the habits of their fathers and mothers.” (Bussemer 2000, p. 43, translated by TK) One went 
with America against America (Gassert 2001). Two forms of Anti-Americanism can be 
differentiated, a political and a cultural form (Sontheimer 1986): The latter sees in the American 
values and their transformation into practice a form of cultural expression that outclasses the 
European standards. As already represented, this opinion found no large spreading in the German 
population. In opposite to the openly expressed criticism at America, one can assume that after 
World War II in nearly all social fields such as economics, science, culture, and politics as well 
as in the population, the elite had an obvious interest in a convergence to the standards set by the 
Americans. 
The political form of Anti-Americanism was more influential because not the abstract 
ideals but the concrete political decisions of the US were criticized, so as described with regards 
to the Vietnam War. But this protest against a concrete decision is not a form of a pure Anti-
Americanism as the tension between fascination of American mass culture and agitation against 
an establishment, united with the American youth which also fights against it, remained. It is 
symptomatic that the musical protest against the Vietnam War in the Federal Republic hardly 
found expression in the German-language — Bob Dylan, Joan Baez, Frank Zappa or Country Joe 
supplied the popular songs for the young people (Schildt 2000). On the one hand we can ask, 
because of the openly expressed refusal of America, to what extent anti-individualistic thought 
patterns of the national socialism had a lasting effect; on the other hand non-democratic 
perspectives were challenged at the same time further on and the individual was pushed more 
into the center which in political terms was expressed in the slogan “Dare more democracy!” 
(Mehr Demokratie wagen!) by Willy Brandt — who was to become the first social-democratic 
Federal Chancellor in 1969 and who was able to commit many representative critical leftists with 
it. 
The protest movement of 1968 changed the course of such assimilations to the 
establishment gradually into a post-materially aligned cult of self-realization. The more the 
political Anti-Americanism lost impact and American individualism opened Kant’s inheritance, 
the less interesting became politics as a field of discussion. Thus, if political acting and the 
individual were in the beginnings in the effort for more individual liberties still on the same side, 
the distrust to the national steering ability of society increased with increasing confidence into 
the new liberty. At the beginning of the 1970s one speaks of a “crisis of legitimating” 
(Legitimationskrise), while the word of “impossibility to govern” (Unregierbarkeit) is spread at 
the same time. The problems were all too obvious. Above all, the oil crisis and the report of the 
“Club of Rome” at the beginning of that decade made everyone aware of the border of the 
national influence. In the 1980s on the one hand the steering pessimism continues, which was 
expressed as a resistance to each “interpretation dressage” and as “zero zest for action” —
mentality. “Disenchantment with politics” diffuses in the 1990s. At the same time some people 
remark that they can achieve something politically under the given conditions. The social 
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movements engaging for environmental, female and peace acts are pioneers of sub-political 
measures in these times.  
Summarized: This “tour de force” through German postwar history was intended to 
clarify that one must understand the “Americanization” described here as a process, in that 
American symbols penetrated the social-cultural system of Germany. These symbols can be 
acquired or also be rejected (Greiner 1999). Americanization and Self-Americanization (Maase 
1997) go hand in hand. New elements are brought with the conventional one (also with anti-
Americanisms) into an emergent unit whose most important field is common practice. 
  
A New Germany 
 
In sum, Germany was in this way almost forced to the transformation of its cultural 
inheritance of individualism, although it not yet completely adapted to American conditions and 
perhaps will never do so: “It is crucial that it came to a mixture of native and imported elements. 
In some mixtures, the American elements penetrate more strongly than in others” (Frei 1996, p. 
799, translated by TK). 
The Kantian inheritance of German individualism could not be completely replaced, but 
also, not continued without breakings. Even if American individualism perhaps did not become 
totally accepted in Germany, like the American conception of rationalization (Ritzer 2000): 
Eventually the turn towards individualism had to be noticeable to the scholars, too. But whilst a 
large part of them worked out for a long time the “Nazis”, e.g. with the “historian-clash” 
(“Historikerstreit”) in the late 1980s, the younger generation of the sociologists discovered the 
new trend. And it does not surprise now, too, that this associated “culture-break” resulted in 
hefty discussions nearly only in German sociology: If established cultural views break down 
gradually and reveal new liberties then this has to produce a strong resonances in the social 
system as they were not caused in other countries due to other cultural initial conditions. 
Actually, also the result of the individualization discourse could be suggested early, because it 
was to be foreseen that the release of the individual “among Kant and America” would take 
place: the individualization of modern society is identified as a dialectic procedure which 
concerns both, the emergence and the process and the consequences of individualization. So 
individualization is e.g. not conceivable without standardization or “collectivization” (Kron 
2001; Ritzer/Murphy 2002).  
This dialectic description also bears consequences for the solutions suggested by the 
German authors for the coping with the tension which results for the individual from the dialectic 
situation: the individualized ambivalence coping. Individualized ambivalence coping here means 
on the one hand this rather individual-passive attitude to all things of life: one must learn to bear 
contradictions; to accept differences and to learn to play with that nothing. On the other hand, the 
individual potentials can be transformed into active acting, like Ulrich Beck above all with his 
conception of “sub-politics” stresses, which disposes the equating of state and politics, if beyond 
political institutions an “unexpected renaissance of a political subjectivity” (Beck 1997) is 
formed. To what extent this may succeed in the concrete individual case, particularly since 
systemic-structural momentums and self-referential tendencies are not so simple to affect or 
controllable “from bottom up” is another thing. In sum however, the individual is solely 
responsible for handling the dialectical conditions and for the realization of the own life.  
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As a background of this description of the social-historical development of the cultural 
identity of Germany, I would now like to show with the example of the US as a contrast, why it 





In the US as well, there is a cultural foundation of the understanding about the 
relationship of the individual and society (Münch 1986b; 2001). This understanding was likewise 
based on an idea of liberty that is constitutive for America both, for the integration inward and 
for the representation outward. However, an individualization discourse as in Germany has not 
been taking place in the US because the cultural tradition is directly continued there. There is no 
such culture change as in Germany, even if the American-cultural continuity must be fought for 
until today. 
 
The Cultural Inheritance of Individualism in America  
 
The cultural conception of the relationship of individual and society in the US can be 
understood as a result of the American revolution, carried above all by Protestant sects, which 
had immigrated from Europe, but were distinguished from the European churches after different 
secularization processes of the strict moral codes amongst other things by voluntary engagement 
of its members, by the detaching of the state, by non-hierarchical internal structure, and by the 
inclusion of ethical principles of self-responsibility as well as achievement orientation. The 
conception of liberty, developed in such a way, is in contrast to Germany no philosophically 
developed idea, but rather a basic idea aligned at practice. Liberty means: to be able to take luck 
into one’s own hand, to be subjected to no external restrictions in concrete situations, to be free 
in action selection and to vary the acting after situational conditions (Münch 1986b). 
The liberty of the market with its freedom of contract and property in this case stands as 
an ideal-typical liberty form, combined with the freedom of association as well as with the 
protection of the individual against national arbitrariness. In contrast to the idealistic liberty 
conception of Germany, liberty conception in American thinking goes a less abstract, but 
practically aligned way. Everyone in America should be able to make its luck as a Self-Made-
Man, even “from dishwasher to millionaire”. Equality is considered as an important value, 
however more in the sense of the precondition for individuality, therefore understood as equal 
chances and not as equality of the conditions or results. Liberty thus, has a clear priority as value 
before equality. Fuchs (2000) describes this form of the American Ethos in summary as 
“competitive individualism” which gains its specifics by the interconnection of liberty and 
equality with the achievement and work ethics in order to guarantee successes in the competition 
between the individuals on different markets. Accordingly, the individual has to care about itself, 
the state to a large extent stays out of social welfare, healthcare, education etc. Further, the state 
should not take off responsibility of the individuals. Regarding this normative postulation one 
can understand the establishment of the political system in America by the community as an 
expression of a selective implementation of cultural values in the social-structural dimension, 
with which intentionally in the American condition a minimum state was tried to be constituted. 
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Particularly the separation between President and Congress, the two Houses of Congress, the 
strong federal structure and the large influence of the courts weaken the power of the state. 
Collective decision power, in addition is predominantly shifted onto the community. The 
community in this case is, in the terminology of Georg Simmel, referred to that comprehensive 
circle closest to the individual which enters the plan of political decisions, if liberties of the 
individuals to one other are impaired and the individuals are not able to find a solution. 
 
Individualism and Social Orientation  
 
The individuals therefore do not bank on social institutions but are left to their own 
responsibility, which implies an independent reflection of the correctness of moral standards. 
Selfishness and moral acting in the American perspective thus do not become a contrast but are 
understood as mutually supplementing sides. In this way, as already stated by Tocqueville 
(2000), Americans, trained from the pragmatic “theory of the well-understood interest”, ride out 
egoism. Here lies the core of the American understanding of individuality: in the interaction of 
self-interest and social sharing. Self-realization as reference beyond society can thus hardly be 
formulated since this would be classified as immoral egoism. The American individual realizes 
itself it in his social framework of everyday life, in the community. 
Individuals who conjointly undertake valuable action, receive support and social 
appreciation by the community in return. The American individualism is a moral individualism. 
The linkages to the environment of the community and the individual contributions of the actors 
for it work in an identical manner. Return services without contributing own achievements, e.g. 
by the excessive expansion of social-national benefits, are felt as immoral. In the context of this 
form of the individualism, which is realized in society and not outside of or against it, a Kantian 
obligation ethics would only cause distrust. 
 
Modification, But No Change: The Cultural Development in America  
 
Even if the American value system has updated itself in the historical development of the 
country continuously, however there were no re-organizations which would be similar to the 
cultural change in Germany described as above (Murswieck 1998). An important date in this 
context is the 29th of October 1929, when due to a speculation boom on the US stock-market, 
carried by an extraordinary optimism towards the own industry, the stock-market experienced 
the largest collapse of history (Junker 1998). In a spiral of the depression, the “stock-market-
crash” affected Europe, whose crisis struck back again America. Apart from structural 
consequences, such as mass unemployment, price purge, etc., the striking social inequalities 
above all, as an obvious contrast to the conception of equal opportunities as a basis for the 
possibility of individual liberty changed the American opinions. 
The consequence at first was a softening of the extremely individualistic and anti-national 
attitude as well as a spreading crisis consciousness in the American population — the 
discrediting of the civilization progress thinking — that made free the way for President 
Roosevelt’s message, it is the obligation of the government to intervene adjusting in the 
economy. He could implement a set of measures, e.g. the reform of the banking sector, 
production and price adjustments in the agricultural sector, introduction of unemployment 
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insurance and retirement schemes etc. However, this national “interventionism” on the basis of 
reflection on the dangers and threats of human existence — the “New Deal” — could not assert 
itself, because above all in May 1935, the highest Court of Justice declared the legislations to be 
unconstitutional for large parts, and because the economy did not want to submit itself to 
political pressure, which was regarded as excessively. In fact, Roosevelt gave new hope to the 
disconcerted nation with its measures, but after all successes were modest. The “Big Depression” 
is an example for the fact that the American value system proves as rather flexible and is able to 
react fluidly to serious events. But it is also clear that this must always take place in the context 
of this value system, as otherwise resistance becomes too large. This is the one side of the 
American cultural way: Watch out that the own cultural way will not be left in the crisis. 
The other side consists of this: Watch out that the own cultural way will not be left even 
in success. For this, completely opposite to Germany, World War II above all and its 
consequences until today are located. There were, already before the 1920’s critics of modern 
America, who saw the modernization as a depreciation and tried to stop the “desintegrating” 
influences (e.g. with the prohibition). But wartime economy was the gate to the way out of the 
economic crisis and a precondition for the fact that the “Great American Success Story” could be 
continued. All changes after the end of World War II: technical innovations, production increase, 
a new role of women or grown self-confidence of the Afro-Americans must be read in the light 
of the development of the American culture towards individualism. 
There were modifications (e.g. the state could further retreat from its role as an 
economical actor), but no fundamental change took place in particular. In sum, the continuous 
economic prosperity after World War II led to a revitalization of the fundamental value 
conceptions in the sense of the preference of free market relations and reservations in relation to 
social-national policy. Between 1947 and 1970 the “American welfare society” developed in 
such a way on the basis of a general conformism. But during this time, culture-critical, 
sociological-time-diagnostic voices already become loud, as for instance those of C. Whright 
Mills or David Riesmann, who interpret conformism as alienation and loss of individual self-
determination. Towards the same direction a counterculture was already formed in contrast to 
conformism, encouraged at end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s by the confidence 
crisis of the political system during the office of Richard Nixon. This counterculture is directed 
against the “American Way of Life” and its material values, acuminated in a view of American 
society as a military industrial controlled system, which has to be encountered with objection. 
This crisis conjuration of the counterculture finds their inheritance in the crisis of the 
understanding of reality, in the American post-modernity (Milich 2001). Reality in a post-
modern perspective is always already designed linguistically and represents an artificial order 
that does not refer to a final truth, so that in reality, everything is principally equally valid, 
whereby in post-modern opinion the fear of loss of the cultural way leads to a constant, yet in the 
long run “unrealizable search for meaning.” The early spreading of the innumerable television 
channels in the US, contrary to Germany, can be seen as a most excellent example of a 
diversification process of the post-modern medium, in which the interrelation of the search for 
meaning and excrescence of signals is pressed ahead in such a way for that only destroying 
excessive time remains a function. 
With this concern of keeping the identity of the individuals in the light of social 
adjustment obligations, one recognizes the typically American effort during the continuation of 
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the own cultural way: Everything is to be done, in order to make as much as possible scope of 
action possible for each individual, but neither society may decay into egoists (danger of 
disintegration), nor may the enabling of the over-individual-national of action itself become an 
obligation (danger of the alienation). However, more importantly than the critical post-modern 
opinions (again limited by a “post-modern realism” in the 1980’s) therefore is that the American 
culture of the 1980’s and 1990’s was marked by multiculturalism. Seemingly directed against a 
central dominant culture, different groups raise a claim on equal cultural representation and 
acknowledgment. Therewith, they actually continue the cultural way of America and help to 
dissolve the contradiction with regards to liberty and equality in American society. 
In summary, the cultural process of the US leads with many oscillations — but clear 
tendency of development — from the puritanical refusal to the authority of a central church up to 
the present individualism. The oscillations are produced by historical successes and setbacks, 
sometimes by the warning of the alienation of the individual, then again by the reminder of the 
social responsibility of the individual. In total, American culture paradoxically always demands 
the development of the full subjectivity of each individual beyond conventions in social life. We 




Since in America there is neither a penetration of new cultural ideas from the outside in 
combination with social-structural changes which opened new possibilities for the individuals, 
nor an abstract conception of liberty which could be interpreted more pragmatically like in 
Germany, a discussion about individualization could not arise. For individualization in the US 
one could perhaps constitute the attitude change in the 1980s in relation to the 1930s and 1940s, 
in which the US presented itself to some aspects as racial, anti-catholic, anti-semite, xenophobic 
and hostile towards women. But this “individualization” in this case would mean, as pointed out, 
the continuation and expansion of the path already taken and not a change like in Germany. 
Therefore the US tries to involve more humans into the cultural ideal of individualism, 
while in Germany another way is actually taken which leads away from the ideal of the internal 
liberty in combination with an orientation at the over-individual law. Individualization in 
Germany refers to a change — understood as analysis of and detachment from cultural 
inheritance — of the value of individualism. In the US, however, individualization means 
durability — understood as progressing and expanding the cultural inheritance against different 
difficulties — of the value of individualism.4  
In contrast to the German individualization discussion, in the US, in the sense of the 
oscillation mentioned above, the problem of the consequences of the social-structurally 
successful implementation of the individualism moved completely into the center. It occurred 
there, what Talcott Parsons (1971) saw as a necessary evolutionary process of change in highly 
differentiated modern societies: if the net of the socially structured situations becomes more 
complex, the value patterns must be fixed on a higher generalization level to secure social 
stability. By value generalization, the authorization of new action patterns becomes secured. If 
this value generalization succeeds, it can however happen that the value, subject to the acting 
distances itself from everyday acting in such a way that the mere eligibility is forgotten. In Emile 
Durkheim’s words, the “cult of the individual” becomes a “cult of the individual.” Exactly this is 
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the core of the diagnosis of the well-known study of Bellah et al. (1987), who found a spreading 
speechlessness about those values, justifying the “sacredness of the individual.” The decisions in 
life of humans appeal to values or priorities, which are not embedded into a further system of 
purposes or convictions and/or are at least not formulated as such. Good is only what someone 
feels as worthwhile, and if the own preferences change, so does the nature of the good. A 
language is missing, in which the really important connections, which define life, can be 
expressed. 
As a consequence of this process, the danger is that too many liberties change to egoism 
and destroy that order, on which they are based (exemplarily Etzioni 1988). Since individuals are 
never self-sufficient, their autonomy may not go so far for that all moral bindings are abrogated. 
But the development of American individualism between the 1960s and 1990s heads towards 
this direction, proven at symptoms such as pretentiousness, refusal of responsibility, redefinition 
of “acceptable criminality,” rise in conflicts, shrinking numbers of voters, alienation, increasing 
number of persons needing help in different forms, declining numbers of family households, 
increase of the divorce rate, loss of standards in the children’s programs, shrinking sexual 
morals, etc. 
How to cope with these consequences of value generalization? The communitarians 
suggest to lower the social-structural differentiation and to bind the individuals again more to 
their community and the associated more concrete values. Another possibility is to show the 
citizens the necessity to remember again those values to which they owe their freedom of action. 
These suggestions, typical for America, became of immediate interest through the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11 in 2001. It is exactly the vulnerability 
waking the memory of the American Spirit, which carries the “American Way of Life” 
(Mathiopoulos 2001). But in which way America and other democratic cultures exactly will 





To summarize, it should have become clear from this culture-theoretical perspective why 
the individualization theorem could get a firm footing in Germany with such popularity and not 
in the US. How the cultural way of the Germans will continue after the reunification, must 
remain open here. Although there is good reason to assume that it likewise comes to a 
generalization of the value individualism in everyday life as a consequence of the 
individualization processes at present (Kron 2001), there is no compelling reason for an 
undisturbed continuation and/or formation of the Americanization regarding the individualism in 
Germany. Possible are, for example, both a Germany that in future will develop towards Europe, 
the more the European Union is able to develop a common identity, and a dissociation from the 
model of American individuality samples and the increasing re-instatement of the state as overall 
address for desires and requirements in the sense of an “nostalgia of the East” (called “Ostalgie” 
by Faulenbach 1998, pp. 21/22). 
The reconstruction of the emergence of the individualization discussion clearly shows, 
how large the misunderstanding is, if—like so often—the conception of American individualism, 
that, like shown, stresses much more the individual liberty in relation to society than German 
234   International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 
 
individualism, is transferred simply to German conditions. Often, as a result, individualization is 
thus interpreted as egoism. Investigations which do so and concentrate, for example on the 
social-structural changes and social inequalities, are blind about the “specific cultural German 





1. I’m very grateful that Torsten Stephan has edited the paper so assiduously. Thank you 
very much! 
2. Because the view of individualization by the German authors point out an internal 
contrariness that is put in the core, I speak here of dialectic and not only of amphiboly, 
the use of individualization in different meanings. This dialectic can also be ambivalent, 
i.e. state positive and negative evaluations. 
3. I do not deal here with the question whether it would not be more meaningful to 
differentiate the overloaded term of the Americanization (also semantic) more sharply, 
e.g. after the ranges within American influences had special effects in Germany. Schildt 
(2000, p. 4) e.g. suggests to differentiate social and cultural influences as 
Americanization from the transfer of political, in particular American ideas, which are to 
be marked as Westernization. With such suggestions, a lack of theoretical basis becomes 
obvious that could find such distinctions of ideas and culture. Besides the view of 
American influencing Germany under the term of Americanization does not mean at the 
same time to exclude influences from Germany on America, e.g. in form of feedbacks 
and cycles. See also Gassert (2000), who criticizes the increasing reductionism of the 
term “Americanization.” In sum, I use the term “Americanization” exclusively in the 
available text as an “illustrative metaphor” in terms of Maase (1997, p. 220).  
4. In fact, in America just like in Germany one speaks of an individualization e.g. in the 
framework from discussions to the change of family structures, but this must be 
understood as an argument with the individualistic progress far into the intimate systems. 
The difference between the US and Germany becomes e.g. institutionally as much clear 
as that there has never been a federal family department or a uniform family policy in the 
US. Instead, there are rather problem-related promotion programmes, particularly for 
mothers and children. One could state a number of further institutional indicators, in 
which this different cultural basis becomes clear, e.g. the smaller burden of the American 
economy by politico-legal interventions, which becomes clear in a comparison of the rate 
of labour cost carried by the state in 1995, with 7.42 German Marks in the US and 20.44 
German Marks in Germany (Murswieck 1998). Or the fact that in the US, civilian-social 
actors have a substantially larger weight in the public discourse than national actors, 
which is exactly the opposite in Germany (Gerhard/Rucht 2000). 
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